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Resource Allocation Polytope Games: Uniqueness of
Equilibrium, Price of Stability, and Price of Anarchy
Swapnil Dhamal, Walid Ben-Ameur, Tijani Chahed, and Eitan Altman
Abstract—We consider a two-player resource allocation polytope game, in which the strategy of a player is restricted by the strategy of
the other player, with common coupled constraints. With respect to such a game, we formally introduce the notions of independent
optimal strategy profile, which is the profile when players play optimally in the absence of the other player; and common contiguous set,
which is the set of top nodes in the preference orderings of both the players that are exhaustively invested on in the independent
optimal strategy profile. We show that for the game to have a unique PSNE, it is a necessary and sufficient condition that the
independent optimal strategies of the players do not conflict, and either the common contiguous set consists of at most one node or all
the nodes in the common contiguous set are invested on by only one player in the independent optimal strategy profile. We further
derive a socially optimal strategy profile, and show that the price of anarchy cannot be bound by a common universal constant. We
hence present an efficient algorithm to compute the price of anarchy and the price of stability, given an instance of the game. Under




THE problem of resource allocation is relevant to alarge number and wide variety of applications, from
small household applications to citywide, marketwide, and
worldwide applications [1], [2], [3], [4]. A primary goal of
an agent is to allocate its resources or budget in such a way
that its utility is maximized. In most scenarios, there exist
competing agents who also aim to allocate their resources
with the aim of maximizing their own utilities. Furthermore,
there could be correlation among the agents’ utilities, for
instance, an investment by an agent on a node may benefit
or harm the utility of another agent [5].
A node or machine for which the resources are to be al-
located (or on which investments are to be made) may have
a bound or capacity beyond which it cannot be invested on.
So the set of feasible investment profiles would be restricted.
This would result in strategic investment by the agents, not
only because they have to invest on multiple nodes, but also
because there would be competition among the agents for
investing on the nodes. This results in a game whose players
are the agents and a player’s strategy is how to allocate its
resources among the nodes while respecting node capacities.
We now describe the setting in detail, and see how it
belongs to the class of games called polytope games [6].
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1.1 Setting
We label the two players as A and B, and the set of nodes
as N . Let n = |N |. Let wAi be the benefit that A gets by
investing a unit amount on node i. Similarly, let wBi be
the benefit that B gets by investing a unit amount on i.
Consistent with most applications, we assume wAi, wBi >
0,∀i ∈ N . Let xi and yi be the respective investments made
byA andB on i. Since the benefit thatA gets by investing on
i would be an increasing function of xi and wAi, we assume
the benefit to be wAixi for analytical tractability. Similarly,
wBiyi is the benefit that B gets by investing on i. Let wA =
(wAi)i∈N , wB = (wBi)i∈N , x = (xi)i∈N , y = (yi)i∈N .
There may be correlation between the players’ utilities
by investing on a node, for example, A’s investment of xi
on node i could result in an added amount of αwAixi in
B’s utility. This could be a benefit if α > 0, a loss if α < 0,
or an uninfluential term if α = 0. So the marginal utility
that B gets from i is (wBiyi + αwAixi). Similarly, if B’s
investment of yi results in an added amount of βwBiyi
in A’s utility, the marginal utility that A gets from i is
(wAixi + βwBiyi). Let uA(x,y) and uB(x,y) denote their
respective utilities. So the net total utility of A summed over
all nodes is uA(x,y) =
∑
i∈N (wAixi + βwBiyi) and that of
B is uB(x,y) =
∑
i∈N (wBiyi + αwAixi).
The players have budget constraints stating that A can
invest a total of, say kA, across all nodes, and B can invest a
total of kB . That is,
∑
i∈N xi ≤ kA,
∑
i∈N yi ≤ kB . Also, the
total amount that can be invested on a node is bounded. We
assume that all nodes have a common bound or capacity.
We assume this bound to be 1 without loss of generality. So
we have another set of constraints: xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i, which
are common coupled constraints (a player’s constraints are
satisfied if and only if constraints of the other player are
satisfied for every strategy profile). We assume that kA +
kB ≤ |N | (there are enough nodes to be able to invest on).
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(wBiyi + αwAixi) (1)
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xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N
Since the common coupled constraints and the utility
functions are linear, it can be classified as a polytope game.
1.2 Motivation
There are several scenarios where there would be bound
on allocation on each node by the players combined. Such
a bound could account for critical scenarios where exceed-
ing a certain limit is infeasible or highly undesirable. For
instance, players may want to allocate jobs to machines
(nodes), where each machine cannot accept more than a
certain total load, beyond which it would overheat and
crash. In scenarios where investing on a node means provid-
ing information and convincing arguments (such as during
elections), the bounding constraint may arise owing to the
attention capacity of a node, beyond which any information
may be ignored. In routing, the links usually have capacities,
which are responsible for the cost or time expended; in
scenarios where there is a time limit before which the data
transfers should be completed, the amount of data that can
be transferred over a link would be bounded. Such resource
allocation examples with linear bounding constraints form
our motivation to study resource allocation polytope games.
The study of existence and uniqueness of equilibrium,
and price of stability and price of anarchy, is often im-
portant for games inspired by practical applications. There
have been extensive studies on these topics in resource
allocation setting (such as routing) and other games such
as congestion games, where there is an underlying cost
function for allocating resources (or assigning job) to a
node. The fundamental assumption in such studies is that
the cost function is continuous, while most studies also
assume smoothness for deriving the price of stability and
the price of anarchy. An additional assumption of strict
concavity is made to prove uniqueness of equilibrium. Our
setting can be transformed so as to have a cost function
instead of a bound on nodes, however such a cost function
would have to be discontinuous, since the cost would shoot
to infinity beyond the bound. So though the fundamental
base is common, replacing continuous cost functions with
bounding constraints demands a very different treatment,
which this paper aims to study.
1.3 Preliminaries
Definition 1 (Feasible strategy). We say that x is a feasible
strategy, given the strategy y, if and only if ∀i, 0 ≤ xi ≤ 1− yi
and
∑
i xi ≤ kA. Similarly, y is a feasible strategy, given x, if
and only if ∀i, 0 ≤ yi ≤ 1− xi and
∑
i yi ≤ kB .
So a strategy profile (x,y) is feasible if and only if∑
i xi ≤ kA,
∑
i yi ≤ kB and ∀i, 0 ≤ xi + yi ≤ 1. Given
a strategy y of player B, we represent the set of feasible
strategies of player A by F (y). And given a strategy x of A,
let the set of feasible strategies of B be F (x).
Definition 2 (Pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE)). A
feasible strategy profile (x∗,y∗) is a PSNE if and only if
∀x′ ∈ F (y∗), uA(x∗,y∗) ≥ uA(x′,y∗)
and ∀y′ ∈ F (x∗), uB(x∗,y∗) ≥ uB(x∗,y′)
Since the feasible strategy set of a player depends on
the strategy of the other player, this equilibrium is termed
generalized Nash equilibrium [7].
The linear utility function and a bound on investment
per node, result in a preference ordering on nodes by the







i . So if wAi > wAj , then A would
invest on node j only if it is not possible to further invest on
node i (owing to constraint xi ≤ 1− yi). Hence, wAi > wAj
implies that A prefers i over j; let us denote this by i A j.
One of the primary goals of this paper is to study
conditions under which the game has a unique PSNE.
However, if multiple nodes hold the same benefit for a
player, investing an amount in one node would be as good
as investing this amount in another node holding the same
benefit, which also would be as good as distributing this
amount over multiple nodes holding the same benefit. So,
in order to avoid trivial non-uniqueness of PSNE due to
ties, we assume that wAi’s are distinct, that is, wAi 6= wAj
for i 6= j. Similarly, wBi 6= wBj for i 6= j. So each player
has a strict ordering over nodes. Hence wA induces a strict
preference ordering on nodes with respect to player A, say
πA, such that
r1>r2 ⇐⇒ πA(r1)AπA(r2)⇐⇒ wAπA(r1)>wAπA(r2)
where πA(r) is the rth node in the preference ordering of
player A. Similarly, wB induces ordering πB for player B.
1.4 Related Work
As explained earlier, the game we consider falls in the class
of polytope games [6], and the notion of equilibrium we
study is generalized Nash equilibrium [7]. A notable study
[8] shows existence of equilibrium in a constrained game,
and its uniqueness in a strictly concave game. Another study
[9] focuses on equilibrium behavior in games with common
coupled constraints.
There have been studies on existence and uniqueness of
Nash equilibrium with respect to a variety of applications
transformed into games [10], [11]. It is known that PSNE is
guaranteed to exist in a class of games having an underlying
potential function, popularly known as potential games [12].
There have also been studies on convergence to Nash equi-
librium with respect to a number of applications [13], [14].
A two-node multiple links system has been shown to have a
unique equilibrium under certain convexity conditions [15].
The quality or goodness of Nash equilibria has been
a topic of study in several application, and has been of
particular interest in network games with regard to the price
of stability [16], [17] and the price of anarchy [18], [19], [20].
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1.5 Our Contributions
Though there have been studies on generalized Nash equi-
libria and the existence of equilibrium in polytope games
is known, it is not clear if it is unique and what the price
of stability and the price of anarchy are. Most studies on
uniqueness leverage the strict concavity (or convexity) of the
underlying game. Since our game is neither strictly convex
nor strictly concave, it requires a different treatment to de-
termine the conditions under which the game would have a
unique equilibrium. Also, though price of stability and price
of anarchy have been studied with respect to congestion
and other resource allocation games, such studies assume
the cost functions to be continuous and do not consider
common coupled constraints. Hence, this is the first game
theoretic study on resource allocation polytope games, with
respect to determining the conditions for uniqueness of
equilibrium and deriving the price of stability and the price
of anarchy.
2 CONDITIONS FOR UNIQUENESS OF PSNE
We first provide a simple existential proof.
Lemma 1. PSNE exists in the considered game.
Proof. Suppose that player A plays a strategy x′ that max-
imizes
∑

















both sides, we get uB(x′,y′) ≥ uB(x′,y),∀y ∈ F (x′).
Since y′ ∈ F (x′), we have x′i + y′i ≤ 1,∀i, and hence


















i on both sides, we get uA(x
′,y′) ≥
uA(x,y
′),∀x ∈ F (y′). So strategy profile (x′,y′) is a PSNE.
Since we can always find such a strategy profile with this
procedure, there exists a PSNE.




i + wBiyi) −∑
i(wAix
′′
i + wBiyi),∀x′,x′′ ∈ F (y) (by adding
∑
i(1 −
β)wBiyi to both uA(x′,y) and uA(x′′,y)). Similarly, we







i ),∀y′,y′′ ∈ F (x). So the game can
be classified as an exact restricted potential game [21], with
potential function Φ(x,y) =
∑
i(wAixi + wBiyi) and the
restrictions on the strategies of A and B being x ∈ F (y)
and y ∈ F (x), respectively. Since there exists a PSNE in
an exact restricted potential game, this gives an alternative
proof of Lemma 1. The lemma could also be viewed as a
special case of a more general existential result [22].
We now introduce some important terminologies.
Definition 3 (Independent optimal strategy). An independent
optimal strategy of a player is the strategy that it would play in
the absence of the other player.
Let x̂ = (x̂i)i∈N , ŷ = (ŷi)i∈N be the independent
optimal strategies ofA andB, respectively. The independent
optimal strategy of A is to invest on nodes, one at a time,
according to its ordering πA, with a maximum of 1 unit per
node, until its budget kA is exhausted. That is, x̂πA(r) =
1,∀r ≤ bkAc and x̂πA(bkAc+1) = frac(kA) = kA − bkAc
and x̂πA(r) = 0,∀r ≥ bkAc + 2. The independent optimal
strategy of B is analogous. Let (x̂, ŷ) be the independent
optimal strategy profile (IOS). As we assume orderings πA,
πB to be strict (hence unique), we have that the IOS is
unique.
Definition 4 (Non-conflicting IOS). The IOS (x̂, ŷ) is non-
conflicting if and only if x̂i + ŷi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N .
Lemma 2. For the game to have a unique PSNE, it is necessary
that the IOS is non-conflicting.
Proof. If the IOS is conflicting, there exists a node i such that
x̂i + ŷi > 1. On similar lines as the proof of Lemma 1, if
player A plays first, it would invest x̂i on node i, and B
would then be able to invest 1 − x̂i < ŷi on node i. On the
other hand, if playerB plays first, it would invest ŷi on node
i, and A would then be able to invest 1− ŷi < x̂i on node i.
These result in two different PSNE’s since x̂i + ŷi 6= 1.
In general, for every xi ∈ [1 − ŷi, x̂i] and yi = 1 − xi,
the nodes in N \ {i} can be invested upon by A and B
with respective budgets kA − xi and kB − yi, according to
the procedure in the proof of Lemma 1. It can be seen that
such an allocation would be a PSNE. Since [1 − ŷi, x̂i] is an
uncountable set, we have uncountable number of PSNE’s.
Lemma 3. The IOS being non-conflicting is not sufficient for the
uniqueness of PSNE.
Proof. We provide a counterexample. Let kA = kB = 2,
wA = (5 4 3 2 1), wB = (3 1 5 2 4). These result in non-
conflicting IOS: x̂ = (1 1 0 0 0), ŷ = (0 0 1 0 1). But it
has multiple PSNE’s, for instance, x = (1 1 0 0 0),y =
(0 0 1 0 1) and also x = (0 1 1 0 0),y = (1 0 0 0 1).
We introduce some notation to facilitate our proofs. The
notation can be understood with the illustration in Figure 1.
Let TA be the set of nodes on which player A would
prefer to invest 1 unit each, that is, it is the set of top bkAc
nodes in the ordering πA. Let TB be defined analogously.
That is,
TA = {i : x̂i = 1, ŷi = 0} = {πA(r)}bkAcr=1
TB = {i : ŷi = 1, x̂i = 0} = {πB(r)}bkBcr=1
If there is a residual budget of player A (frac(kA) = kA−
bkAc) after investing in TA, let lA be the node on which it
would prefer to invest this residual budget. Note that lA
does not exist when kA is an integer, and if it exists, it is
πA(bkAc+ 1). Let lB be defined analogously. That is,
lA = i s.t. x̂i = frac(kA) ∈ (0, 1)
and ∃lA =⇒ lA = πA(bkAc+ 1)
lB = i s.t. ŷi = frac(kB) ∈ (0, 1)
and ∃lB =⇒ lB = πB(bkBc+ 1)
If lA and lB is the same node, we denote it by lAB . Note
that with respect to non-conflicting IOS, lAB exists only if
frac(kA) + frac(kB) ≤ 1.
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TA
CA
l  = lA         B
ETB
SB
Fig. 1. An example illustration of terminologies with respect to player A’s
ordering πA, where kA = 2.7, kB = 3.3 (grey corresponds to x̂, black
corresponds to ŷ)
Finally, let E be the set of nodes on which neither player
opts to invest in the IOS. That is,
E = {i : x̂i = ŷi = 0}
Definition 5 (Contiguous set). We define the contiguous set
in a player’s preference ordering to be the set of top nodes in
its ordering until we encounter a node which has partial or zero
combined investment in the IOS.
Let CA and CB denote the contiguous set in the preference
orderings of players A and B, respectively. So,
CA = {πA(r)}qA−1r=1
s.t. x̂i + ŷi = 1,∀i ∈ CA and x̂πA(qA) + ŷπA(qA) < 1
CB = {πB(r)}qB−1r=1
s.t. x̂i + ŷi = 1,∀i ∈ CB and x̂πB(qB) + ŷπB(qB) < 1
Definition 6 (Common contiguous set). We define common
contiguous set to be the set of nodes belonging to the contiguous
sets in the preference orderings of both the players.
Let CAB denote the common contiguous set. So,
CAB = CA ∩ CB
Let SA denote the set of nodes in TA, which also belong
to the common contiguous set in the ordering of player B.
Let SB be defined analogously. So we have
SA = CB ∩ TA and SB = CA ∩ TB
Lemma 4. If IOS (x̂, ŷ) is non-conflicting, then a strategy profile
(x,y) is a PSNE only if xi + yi = x̂i + ŷi,∀i ∈ N .
Proof. Since the IOS is non-conflicting, we have that x̂i +
ŷi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ N . If ∃i ∈ TA s.t. xi + yi < 1, since player
A’s budget kA ≥ |TA|, it must have invested in some node
j /∈ TA, that is, xj > 0. Now since i A j,∀i ∈ TA,∀j /∈ TA,
player A can gain by transferring an amount ε > 0 from
node j to node i, that is, by investing xi + ε in node i and
xj − ε in node j. So a strategy profile in which ∃i ∈ TA s.t.
xi + yi < 1, cannot be a PSNE. So (x,y) is a PSNE only
if xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ TA. Similarly, (x,y) is a PSNE only if
xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ TB . So we have proved that (x,y) is a
PSNE only if xi + yi = x̂i + ŷi (= 1),∀i ∈ TA ∪ TB .
The total budget to be invested over all nodes by both
the players combined is kA+kB . Now we consider different
cases depending on the existence of lA, lB (or lAB) and show
that xi + yi = x̂i + ŷi for these nodes in PSNE.
If @lA, @lB , there is nothing to prove.
If ∃lA,∃lB (lA 6= lB), we have xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ TA ∪ TB ,
so the total amount invested in TA ∪ TB is bkAc + bkBc.
Since the budget invested by both the players combined is
kA+kB , the residual amount of (kA+kB)−(bkAc+bkBc) =
frac(kA) + frac(kB) = x̂lA + ŷlB has to be distributed over
nodes not in TA ∪ TB , namely, E ∪ {lA} ∪ {lB}. That is,∑
i∈E
(xi+ yi) + (xlA + ylA) + (xlB + ylB ) = x̂lA + ŷlB (2)
If xlA + ylA < x̂lA = frac(kA), A’s investment in TA ∪ {lA}
is less than |TA| + x̂lA = bkAc + frac(kA) = kA, which
is its budget. So it must have invested in some node j /∈
TA∪{lA}, that is, xj > 0. Now since lA A j,∀j /∈ TA∪{lA},
A can gain by transferring an amount ε > 0 from j to lA,
that is, by investing xlA + ε in lA and xj − ε in j. So a profile
in which xlA + ylA < x̂lA , cannot be a PSNE. So (x,y) is a
PSNE only if xlA + ylA ≥ x̂lA = frac(kA). Similarly, (x,y)
is a PSNE only if xlB + ylB ≥ ŷlB = frac(kB). These, along
with Equation (2), give our desired condition:∑
i∈E
(xi + yi) = 0 , (xlA + ylA) = x̂lA , (xlB + ylB ) = ŷlB
The cases @lA,∃lB and ∃lA, @lB can be proved on similar
lines as the above case.
We now consider the case ∃lAB (lA = lB). If ∃lAB , the
residual amount of (kA+kB)− (bkAc+ bkBc) = frac(kA)+
frac(kB) = x̂lAB + ŷlAB has to be distributed over nodes not
belonging to TA ∪ TB , namely, E ∪ {lAB}. That is,∑
i∈E
(xi + yi) + (xlAB + ylAB ) = x̂lAB + ŷlAB (3)
If xlAB + ylAB < x̂lAB + ŷlAB = frac(kA) + frac(kB), the
combined investment of A and B in TA ∪TB ∪{lAB} is less
than |TA|+ |TB |+ x̂lAB + ŷlAB = bkAc+ bkBc+ frac(kA) +
frac(kB) = kA + kB . So A or B must have invested in some
node j ∈ E, that is, xj > 0. Now since lAB A j, lAB B
j,∀j ∈ E, any player which has invested in node j can gain
by transferring an amount ε > 0 from node j to node lAB ,
that is, by investing xlAB + ε in node lAB and xj − ε in node
j. So a strategy profile in which xlAB + ylAB < x̂lAB + ŷlAB ,
cannot be a PSNE. So (x,y) is a PSNE only if xlAB + ylAB ≥
x̂lAB +ŷlAB = frac(kA)+frac(kB). This, along with Equation
(3), gives our desired condition:∑
i∈E
(xi + yi) = 0 and (xlAB + ylAB ) = x̂lAB + ŷlAB
So in all the cases, we have shown that, if IOS (x̂, ŷ) is
non-conflicting and strategy profile (x,y) is a PSNE, then
xi + yi = x̂i + ŷi,∀i ∈ N .
Corollary 1. If IOS (x̂, ŷ) is non-conflicting and a strategy
profile (x,y) is a PSNE, then x = x̂⇐⇒ y = ŷ.
We now present the necessary and sufficient conditions
for the uniqueness of PSNE. The reader may refer to Table 1
for better understanding the different cases in the proof.
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TABLE 1
Examples for different cases in the proof of Proposition 1
πA πB kA kB TA {m} SB TB CA CB CAB CAB invested on Case
by one player? #
(a b c d e) (c b a d e) 1.5 1.4 {a} {} {} {c} {a} {c} {} − 1
(a b c d e) (c e a d b) 2 1.5 {a, b} {} {c} {c} {a, b, c} {c} {c} Yes 1
(a b c d e) (c d e a b) 2 2 {a, b} {} {c, d} {c, d} {a, b, c, d} {c, d} {c, d} Yes 1
(a b c d e) (d b c a e) 1.5 1.5 {a} {b} {} {d} {a, b} {d, b} {b} No 2
(a b c d e) (c e a d b) 2 2 {a, b} {} {c} {c, e} {a, b, c} {c, e, a} {a, c} No 3
(a b c d e) (c b a d e) 1.5 1.5 {a} {b} {c} {c} {a, b, c} {c, b, a} {a, b, c} No 3
Proposition 1. Assuming that nodes can be strictly ordered by
both players, the game has a unique PSNE if and only if the IOS is
non-conflicting and either (a) the common contiguous set consists
of at most one node, or (b) all the nodes in the common contiguous
set are invested on by only one player in the IOS. Also, if the
game has a unique PSNE, it is same as the IOS, else the number
of PSNE’s is uncountable.
Proof. Since it is necessary that the IOS is non-conflicting,
we look at all possibilities of non-conflicting IOS.
Recall that a contiguous set consists of nodes which are
exhaustively invested on in the IOS. Such nodes can be
invested on by player A or B or both. If such a node i is
completely invested on by player A in IOS, then i ∈ TA,
while if it is invested on by player B, then i ∈ TB . If it is
invested on by both the players combined, then i = lAB .
In what follows, if node lAB is such that x̂lAB + ŷlAB = 1,
we label the node as m. Now, the contiguous set of player
A (CA) would typically consist of all the nodes on which
it would want to invest 1 unit each (TA), followed perhaps
by a node on which it would want to invest the residual
fractional part of its budget (m), followed perhaps by some
nodes on which player B would want to invest 1 unit each
(SB). Similar would be the contiguous set of player B (CB).
We now consider all possible cases to prove the result.
Case 1 (CA = TA) or (CB = TB):
We prove for CA = TA (proof for CB = TB is similar).
If CA = TA, we have that the node i = πA(bkAc + 1)
following the last node of TA (and hence CA) in the ordering
of A, is such that x̂i + ŷi < 1. Note also that i /∈ TB , since
x̂j + ŷj = 1,∀j ∈ TB . So we have i A j,∀j ∈ TB . Since
x̂i + ŷi < 1, any PSNE would follow xi + yi < 1 (from
Lemma 4). So a strategy profile in which player A invests
xj > 0 in some node j ∈ TB cannot be a PSNE, since it can
gain by transferring an amount ε > 0 from node j to node
i. So player A does not invest in any j ∈ TB in a PSNE.
So if @lB , we have y = ŷ and so x = x̂ (Corollary 1).
If ∃lAB , it has to be πA(bkAc+ 1), in which case, x̂lAB +
ŷlAB < 1 (it cannot be exhausted since CA = TA). Since lAB
is shared node, it is partially invested on by B, and so it
has to also be πB(bkBc+ 1). Since lAB follows the last node
of TB in the ordering of B and is not exhausted in IOS, we
have CB = TB . Since assuming CA = TA, we showed A
does not invest in TB , in this case where CB = TB , we can
similarly show B does not invest on TA. So in any PSNE,
A invests bkAc in TA and B invests bkBc in TB . So the
residual budget of A (frac(kA) = x̂lAB ) would be invested
in lAB since lAB A j,∀j /∈ TA ∪ {lAB}; that is, in a PSNE,
xlAB = x̂lAB . Since we now have x = x̂, it implies y = ŷ.
Now if ∃lB (not shared in IOS), lB is not invested on by
A in IOS, and since by definition, lB /∈ TB , we have x̂lB +
ŷlB < 1. Since lB follows the last node of TB in the ordering
of B and is not exhausted in IOS, we have CB = TB . So
with the same argument as the above case of ∃lAB , in any
PSNE, A invests bkAc in TA and B invests bkBc in TB . If B
does not invest the residual amount of frac(kB) = ŷlB on lB ,
it would have invested some amount in node j /∈ TB∪{lB};
and B can gain by transferring some amount from j to lB .
So in any PSNE, we would have B investing frac(kB) = ŷlB
in lB . And since we now have y = ŷ, it implies x = x̂.
This follows regardless of whether or not TA, TB are empty.
Since CAB ⊆ CA, CAB ⊆ CB , this case had CAB ⊆ TA
(if CA = TA) or CAB ⊆ TB (if CB = TB), and so all nodes
of CAB were invested on by only one player in the IOS, or
CAB = {}. We showed for this case, IOS is the only PSNE.
Since we have considered the case where CA = TA or
CB = TB , the remaining cases have {m} or SB or both in
CA, and {m} or SA or both in CB .
Case 2 (CA = TA ∪ {m} and CB = TB ∪ {m}):
Here, we have that i = πA(bkAc + 2) following node m
in the ordering of A, is such that x̂i + ŷi < 1. Since there
is shared node m, it can be the only shared node, and since
i /∈ TA ∪ TB because x̂j + ŷj = 1,∀j ∈ TA ∪ TB , we have
i ∈ E and hence x̂i + ŷi = 0. So we have i A j,∀j ∈ TB
and i B j,∀j ∈ TA. Since x̂i + ŷi = 0, any PSNE would
follow xi + yi = 0 (from Lemma 4). So a strategy profile in
which A invests xj > 0 in some j ∈ TB cannot be a PSNE,
since it can gain by transferring an amount ε > 0 from node
j to node i. So A does not invest in any j ∈ TB in a PSNE.
Similarly, B does not invest in any j ∈ TA in a PSNE.
So in any PSNE, A invests bkAc in TA and B invests
bkBc in TB . So the residual budget of A is frac(kA) and that
of B is frac(kB). Since there is a node m, by its definition,
we have frac(kA)+frac(kB) = 1. Sincem A j,∀j ∈ TB∪E
and m B j,∀j ∈ TA ∪ E, the residual budget of both the
players would be invested in node m in any PSNE. So we
have a unique PSNE (x,y) which follows x = x̂,y = ŷ.
This follows regardless of whether or not TA, TB are empty.
In this case, CAB consisted of only one node (m), and for
this case, we showed that the IOS is the only PSNE.
SWAPNIL DHAMAL ET AL. RESOURCE ALLOCATION POLYTOPE GAMES: UNIQUENESS OF EQUILIBRIUM, POS, AND POA (AAAI 2018) 6
Case 3 (CA = TA ∪ {m} ∪ SB and CB = TB ∪ {m})
or (CA = TA ∪ {m} and CB = TB ∪ {m} ∪ SA)
or (CA = TA ∪ {m} ∪ SB and CB = TB ∪ {m} ∪ SA)
or (CA = TA ∪ SB and CB = TB ∪ SA) :
In this case, we have |CAB | ≥ 2,
∑
i∈CAB x̂i > 0,∑







i∈CAB ŷi and xj = x̂j , yj =
ŷj ,∀j /∈ CAB , player A cannot improve by removing any
amount from CAB , since ∀i ∈ CAB , any node t A i would
be exhaustively invested on (because CAB ⊆ CA and from
Lemma 4). Similarly, B cannot improve since CAB ⊆ CB .





i∈CAB x̂i > 0,
∑
i∈CAB yi =∑
i∈CAB ŷi > 0 and xj = x̂j , yj = ŷj ,∀j /∈ CAB . This
results in uncountable number of possible allocations, and
hence uncountable number of PSNE’s.
In this case, the common contiguous set consisted of
at least two elements and all of these elements were not
invested on by only one player in the IOS. For this case, we
showed the existence of uncountable number of PSNE’s.
So we have proved that, if condition (a) or (b) of the
proposition is satisfied (Cases 1 and 2), we have that the
game has a unique PSNE and it is same as the IOS. Con-
versely, if neither of the conditions is satisfied (Case 3), we
have that the game has uncountable number of PSNE’s.
3 PRICE OF STABILITY AND PRICE OF ANARCHY
A socially optimal strategy profile is a profile that maximizes
the sum of players’ utilities. In our game, it is a profile
(x,y) that maximizes
∑





i ((1 + α)wAixi + (1 + β)wBiyi). Let ‘best
PSNE’ be a PSNE that maximizes the sum of players’
utilities, and ‘worst PSNE’ be a PSNE that minimizes it.
The price of stability is defined as the ratio between the
sum of players’ utilities in a socially optimal strategy profile
and that in the best PSNE. Similarly, the price of anarchy is
the ratio between the sum of players’ utilities in a socially
optimal strategy profile and that in the worst PSNE.
3.1 Socially Optimal Strategy Profile
Let zAi = (1 + α)wAi and zBi = (1 + β)wBi. So a socially
optimal strategy profile, and hence the maximum sum of
players’ utilities, can be obtained by maximizing
∑
i(zAixi+
zBiyi) over the set of feasible strategy profiles.
If α ≤ −1 and β > −1, it can be seen that the socially
optimal strategy profile would have player A not investing
at all and player B investing ŷ, so the sum of players’
utilities would be
∑
i(1 + β)wBiŷi. Similarly, if β ≤ −1
and α > −1, the socially optimal profile would have
player B not investing at all and player A investing x̂, thus
resulting in the sum of players’ utilities as
∑
i(1 + α)wAix̂i.
If α, β ≤ −1, neither player would invest in the socially
optimal profile, and so the sum of players’ utilities would
be zero.
We now analyze the more involved case when α, β >
−1. In this case, zA = (1 + α)wA and zB = (1 + β)wB are
constant positive scaling. So the orderings of A and B (πA
and πB) remain unchanged if they respectively order the
nodes according to zA and zB , instead of wA and wB . In
an optimal profile, let jB be the last node in the preference
ordering of player B on which B invests, that is, B does not
invest beyond this node. Let jA be defined analogously. Let
IA = {πA(r)}jA−1r=1 and IB = {πB(r)}
jB−1
r=1
JA = {πA(r)}nr=jA+1 and JB = {πB(r)}
n
r=jB+1
If ∃i ∈ IB : xi + yi < 1, value of
∑
i zBiyi can be increased
(without altering
∑
i zAixi), by transferring some of B’s
investment from πB(jB) to i. So in a social optimal profile,
it should be that ∀i ∈ IB : xi + yi = 1, that is, yi = 1 − xi.













































































max{zBi − zBπB(jB), 0}+ kBzBπB(jB)
]
(4)
For checking the consistency of jB , we check if the
amount left for B after investing in IB , that is, the amount
allocated for πB(jB), is between 0 and 1− xπB(jB). That is,
0 ≤ kB −
∑
i∈IB








xi + xπB(jB) ≤ jB − kB (6)
Since at least dkBe nodes are required for B to spend
its budget, we have yπB(r) = 1 − xπB(r),∀r < dkBe. So
from the definition of jB , we have jB ≥ dkBe. Also, if A
invests in the most preferred nodes of B (amounting to a
maximum of kA), B would invest its available amount kB
in nodes so as to be a feasible investment strategy, given A’s
investment. So B would not invest in any node which is
beyond πB(dkA + kBe) in its ordering. That is, jB ≤ dkA +
kBe.
Player A’s strategy in socially optimal profile can be
obtained by maximizing (4) subject to Constraints (5) and
(6), and xi ∈ [0, 1],∀i, over values of jB ∈ [dkBe, dkA+kBe].
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Algorithm 1: Socially optimal strategy profile
Input: wA, wB , kA, kB , α, β
Output: Strategy profile (x,y) that maximizes
v = uA(x,y) + uB(x,y)
v∗ ← −∞
for jB ← dkBe to dkA + kBe do
for i← 1 to n do
ν
(jB)
i = (1 + α)wAi






i=1 xπ(i) ≥ (jB − kB)− 1 and∑jB
i=1 xπ(i) ≤ jB − kB (using greedy
method)
v(jB) = χ(jB) + kB(1 + β)wBπB(jB)
+
∑
imax{(1 + β)(wBi − wBπB(jB)), 0}





i yizBi s.t. y ≤ 1− x
∗
With jB fixed, we use a greedy algorithm (instead of solving
the linear program), where A invests in nodes i one at a
time (up to 1 unit per node) in ascending order of the value
(zAi−max{zBi−zBπB(jB), 0}), until kA is exhausted. If this
investment, say x(o), is consistent with (5) and (6), it is our
solution. If it is inconsistent, we make Constraint (5) tight
(then (6) is automatically satisfied), and invest greedily on
nodes in IB , a total of (jB − 1)− kB (such an investment is
possible since |IB | > (jB−1)−kB). The residual amount is
invested greedily on nodes in N \ IB . Suppose this results
in investment x(l). We similarly check by making Constraint
(6) tight, and obtain the corresponding greedy investment
x(u). Owing to linearity of the system, if x(o) is inconsistent
with the constraints, either x(l) or x(u) has to be optimal. So
our solution is x(l) or x(u), whichever gives a higher value
of
∑
i xi(zAi −max{zBi − zBπB(jB), 0}).
To maximize (4), we iterate over jB ∈ [dkBe, dkA + kBe]
to obtain socially optimal strategy of A, say x∗. The socially
optimal strategy of B, say y∗, can be obtained by investing
greedily subject to a maximum of 1 − x∗i in node i, until
kB is exhausted. The social optimal profile is thus, (x∗,y∗).
This method is presented as algorithm in Algorithm 1.
3.2 The Price of Anarchy
We first show that we cannot have a universal constant
bound for the price of anarchy for the entire class of such
games.
Example 1. Say N = {i, j}, kA = kB = 1. Consider wAi =
wBj = M > 1 and wAj = wBi = 1. Let α= β = 0. A socially
optimal profile has xi = 1, yi = 0 and xj = 0, yj = 1. Now
there is a PSNE with xi = 0, yi = 1 and xj = 1, yj = 0.
The ratio between the sum of players’ utilities in socially optimal
profile and that in this PSNE, is M+M1+1 = M . So the price of
anarchy can be arbitrarily large for arbitrarily large M .
In order to compute the price of anarchy for an instance
of the game, we first provide a characterization of PSNE.
Lemma 5. A strategy profile (x,y) is a PSNE if and only if there
exist integers jA, jB such that
∀i ∈ IA ∪ IB : xi + yi = 1
For i = πA(jA), πB(jB) : xi + yi ≤ 1





yi = kB , ∀i ∈ N : xi, yi ≥ 0
Proof. Since the number of nodes and budgets are finite, for
any feasible strategy profile, there would always exist nodes
πA(jA) and πB(jB) in the preference orderings of players
A and B respectively, beyond which A and B would not
invest; so there would exist integers jA, jB corresponding
to any PSNE. However, given integers jA, jB , we can have
several strategy profiles which may or may not be feasible,
and so may not correspond to any PSNE. We need to show
that we would obtain a PSNE if and only if we are able to
find integers jA, jB which satisfy the above conditions.
Note that the last three conditions are generic with
respect to the studied problem (the budget constraints are
tight since it is suboptimal for players to not exhaust their
entire budgets). Moreover, the conditions ∀i ∈ JA : xi =
0, yi ≤ 1 and ∀i ∈ JB : yi = 0, xi ≤ 1 always hold
due to the definitions of jA, jB and hence JA, JB . So we
need to only prove that the first condition is necessary and
sufficient, given the generic conditions and definitions result
in feasible jA, jB .
If xi+yi = 1,∀i ∈ IA∪IB , we have xi+yi = 1,∀i ∈ IA,
and so player A cannot deviate to a better strategy since all
the top nodes in πA are invested on to their limits. Similarly,
we have xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ IB , and so B cannot deviate to a
better strategy. So strategy profile (x,y) is a PSNE.
Suppose ∃i ∈ IA such that xi + yi < 1, and A has
invested in πA(jA), it can gain by transferring an amount
ε > 0 from πA(jA) to i since i A πA(jA). So the strategy
profile (x,y) is not a PSNE. Similar is the case for B. So if
∃i ∈ IA ∪ IB such that xi + yi 6= 1, (x,y) is not a PSNE if A
has invested in πA(jA) or B has invested in πB(jB).
Note that if ∃i ∈ IA such that xi + yi 6= 1, and A has not
invested in node πA(jA) or any node t A i, we redefine
jA to be j′A so that πA(j
′
A) = i and redefine IA to be I
′
A
accordingly. Similarly, we can redefine jB and IB to be j′B
and I ′B if required. If for a given strategy profile (x,y), any
j′A, j
′
B result in xi + yi 6= 1 for some i ∈ IA ∪ IB , (x,y) is
not a PSNE because of the above argument.
The following proposition follows immediately.
Proposition 2. A worst PSNE can be obtained by minimizing
the value of
∑
i((1+α)wAixi+(1+β)wBiyi) over all integers
jA, jB that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 5.
A solution can be obtained efficiently without solving
the linear program, by using a greedy allocation. The idea
is to partition the set of nodes in which A would invest
(IA ∪ {πA(jA)}) into different subsets, and each subset is
allotted a part of the total budget based on the requirements
enforced by the conditions in Lemma 5; the nodes in each
partition are then greedily invested on, one at a time, until
the partition’s share of the budget is exhausted.
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3.3 Greedy Algorithm for Finding Worst PSNE
From Lemma 5, we have ∀i ∈ IA ∪ IB : xi + yi = 1 and
∀i ∈ JB : yi = 0, xi ≤ 1, which give ∀i ∈ IA ∩ JB : xi = 1.
Further, since player A exhausts its budget kA by allocating
among nodes only belonging to IA ∪ πA(jA), we have
that
∑
i∈IA xi + xπA(jA) = kA. As earlier, we check the
consistency of jB by enforcing Inequalities (5) and (6). Also,
if πB(jB) ∈ IA, the amount allocated by player B for
node πB(jB) would be 1 − xπB(jB) (since the allocations
by both players should sum to 1). This would mean that
upper bound in Inequality (6) would be tight, thus leading
to
∑








zAi −max{zBi − zBπB(jB), 0}
)
subject to
∀i ∈ N : xi ∈ [0, 1]
∀i ∈ IA ∩ JB : xi = 1∑
i∈IA
xi + xπA(jA) = kA
if πB(jB) ∈ IA :
{ ∑
i∈IB
xi + xπB(jB) = jB − kB




xi ≥ (jB − 1)− kB∑
i∈IB
xi + xπB(jB) ≤ jB − kB
Case 1 (πB(jB) ∈ IA):
Case 1(a) (πA(jA) ∈ JB):
Since we should have ∀i ∈ IA∩JB ,∀i ∈ IA∩JB , the total
budget allocated by player A for the set IA ∩ JB should be
|IA ∩ JB |. Also we should have
∑
i∈IB xi + xπB(jB) = jB −
kB , that is, the total budget allocated by player A for the set
IB ∪πB(jB) should be jB − kB . Since player A invests only
in nodes belonging to IA∪πA(jA) and πA(jA) ∈ JB (that is,
πA(jA) /∈ IB ∪ πB(jB)), we have that the budget allocated
by player A for the set (IA ∪ πA(jA)) ∩ (IB ∪ πB(jB)) =
IA ∩ (IB ∪ πB(jB)) should be jB − kB . The residual budget
can then be allocated to {πA(jA)}.
So the set IA ∪ {πA(jA)} can be partitioned into three
subsets, with the allocation for each partition as follows:




IA ∩ JB |IA ∩ JB |
IA ∩ (IB ∪ {πB(jB)}) jB − kB
{πA(jA)} kA − |IA ∩ JB | − (jB − kB)
The nodes in each partition are filled one at a time, in
ascending order of the value (1 + α)wAi − max{(1 +
β)(wBi−wBπB(jB)), 0}, until the allocation for that partition
is reached. The budget allocation is valid if and only if
the allocated budget for each partition is non-negative and
not larger than the size of the partition, and the allocated
budgets for the partitions sum to kA.
The other cases follow on similar lines; we now present
the allocations for the partitions in these cases.
Case 1(b) (πA(jA) ∈ IB ∪ {πB(jB)}):
Set IA ∪ {πA(jA)} can be partitioned into subsets,




IA ∩ JB |IA ∩ JB |
IA ∩ (IB ∪ {πB(jB)}) jB − kB
Case 2 (πB(jB) /∈ IA):




IA ∩ JB |IA ∩ JB |
(IA ∪ {πA(jA)}) \ (IA ∩ JB) kA − |IA ∩ JB |
Here, the allocation is valid if two conditions are satisfied:∑
i∈IB
xi ≥ (jB − 1)− kB∑
i∈IB
xi + xπB(jB) ≤ jB − kB
If any of the above two conditions is violated, we need
to restructure the allocation budgets to forcibly satisfy one
of the two extreme possibilities:
Possibility 2(a) (
∑
i∈IB xi = (jB − 1)− kB ):
Case 2(a)[i] (πA(jA) /∈ IB):




IA ∩ JB |IA ∩ JB |
IA ∩ IB (jB − 1)− kB
πA(jA) kA − |IA ∩ JB | − (jB − 1− kB)
Case 2(a)[ii] (πA(jA) ∈ IB):




IA ∩ JB |IA ∩ JB |
(IA ∪ πA(jA)) ∩ IB (jB − 1)− kB
Possibility 2(b) (
∑
i∈IB xi + xπB(jB) = jB − kB ):
Note that this reduces to Case 1, since it also requires
that
∑
i∈IB xi + xπB(jB) = jB − kB .
We then take the minimum of the values obtained in
Possibilities 2(a) and 2(b).
We obtain a worst PSNE by taking the minimum of the









max{zBi − zBπB(jB), 0}+ kBzBπB(jB)
Algorithm 2 presents the concise algorithm for finding
worst PSNE. The time complexity of determining the pref-
erence orderings is O(n log n), following which, the time
complexity for finding worst PSNE is O(nkAkB).
Remark 1. The greedy algorithm outputs a strategy profile
in which, there could be at most two nodes with non-integral
allocation by player A (similarly by player B). Also, if both kA
and kB are integers, all the nodes would have integral allocation
by both the players.
Since we know the socially optimal strategy profile and
worst PSNE, the price of anarchy can hence be computed.
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Algorithm 2: Worst PSNE
Input: wA, wB , kA, kB , α, β
Output: PSNE (x,y) that minimizes
v = uA(x,y) + uB(x,y)
v∗ ← +∞
for jA ← dkAe to dkA + kBe do
for jB ← dkBe to dkA + kBe do
for i← 1 to n do
ν
(jB)







where x is obtained using greedy
method









i yiwBi s.t. y ≤ 1− x
∗
3.4 The Price of Stability
Similar to Proposition 2, the following result can be proved.
Proposition 3. A best PSNE can be obtained by maximizing the
value of
∑
i((1 + α)wAixi + (1 + β)wBiyi) over all integers
jA, jB that satisfy the conditions in Lemma 5.
Algorithm 2 can be modified to find a best PSNE by ini-









i ). That is, in
the greedy algorithm, the nodes in each partition should
be filled in descending order (instead of ascending order) of
the value (1 + α)wAi −max{(1 + β)(wBi − wBπB(jB)), 0},
until the allocation for that partition is reached. Since we
know the socially optimal strategy profile and best PSNE,
the price of stability can be computed.
We now present a specific result for the price of stability
when α, β > −1. The condition α, β > −1 can be viewed
as a practically reasonable one, since in usual scenarios, if
a player’s action (such as allocating job to a machine or
sending data through a link) fetches it a certain benefit, it is
the direct effect of its action; the indirect effect of this action
on the other player’s utility would usually not be negatively
amplified, unless the setting is excessively antagonistic.
Proposition 4. If α, β > −1, the price of stability is 1.
Proof. Consider a strategy profile (x′,y′) that maximizes∑
i ((1 + α)wAix
′
i + (1 + β)wBiy
′
i). Suppose there exists a



































i ((1 + α)wAix
′′
i + (1 + β)wBiy
′
i) >∑
i ((1 + α)wAix
′
i + (1 + β)wBiy
′
i). This implies (x
′,y′) is
not socially optimal, a contradiction. So there is no strategy
to which A can unilaterally deviate to improve its utility.
Similarly, since β > −1, there is no strategy to which B
can unilaterally deviate to improve its utility. So the socially
optimal strategy profile (x′,y′) is a PSNE.
3.5 A Note on Non-Strict Preference Orderings
Under the assumption that players have strict preference
orderings over nodes, we had the following condition in
Lemma 5: xi+yi = 1,∀i ∈ IA∪IB . However, if the orderings
are not strict, this condition would no longer be valid. Recall
that non-strict ordering would mean that we have wAi =
wAj or wBi = wBj for some i 6= j. We now discuss how
this condition can be modified, and hence how the price of
anarchy and the price of stability can be computed, when
the ordering is not strict for at least one player.
Consider an ordering obtained by breaking ties using
any tie breaking rule. Since player A invested in πA(jA),
all nodes strictly more beneficial for A than πA(jA), must
be exhausted; else A could transfer some investment from
πA(jA) to such nodes. Let PA denote the set of such nodes.
However, nodes in IA which are as beneficial for A as
πA(jA) may not be exhausted. This would still be a PSNE
since player A transferring some investment from πA(jA)
to these nodes would not change its utility. Let QA be the
set of these nodes. The argument for player B is analogous
(with PB and QB defined accordingly). So the condition:
xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ (IA ∪ IB) changes to the two conditions:
xi + yi = 1,∀i ∈ (PA ∪ PB),
xi + yi ≤ 1,∀i ∈ (QA ∪QB).
With these modified conditions in Lemma 5, Proposi-
tion 2 can be used to determine the worst PSNE by solving
the linear program (our greedy algorithm cannot be used).
Similarly, Proposition 3 would give the best PSNE. For
α, β > −1, Proposition 4 still holds (the price of stability is
1), since it does not require the unique ordering assumption;
so this best PSNE is the socially optimal profile. For the cases
when α ≤ −1 or β ≤ −1 or both, the corresponding socially
optimal profiles are on same lines as those under strict
preference orderings. Since we know the socially optimal
profile, the worst PSNE, and the best PSNE, we can compute
the price of anarchy and the price of stability.
3.6 A Paradox
In Example 1, we found a PSNE which results in the sum of
players’ utilities to be 2. However, if we reduce the budget
of one of the players (say B) by an infinitesimal amount
ε > 0, the common contiguous set would be empty, thus
leading to a unique PSNE, which would be same as the IOS
(from Proposition 1). The sum of players’ utilities in this new
PSNE is (M+M−Mε), which would be significantly higher
than 2, for large values of M . So reducing the budget may
lead to a better ‘worst PSNE’. In fact, with kA = kB = 1, the
set of PSNE’s can be characterized by allocation xi = yj =
ρ, xj = yi = 1 − ρ, where ρ ∈ [0, 1]. The sum of players’
utilities would thus be 2Mρ + 2(1 − ρ), which for almost
all values of ρ, would be lesser than 2M − Mε (which is
the sum of utilities in the unique PSNE when B’s budget
is reduced). Further, both players would individually gain
with this reduced budget with respect to almost all values
of ρ.
Though we used a particular example to show that
lowering the budget may lead to a better outcome, the
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underlying reasoning is general. If the IOS is such that re-
ducing players’ budgets by relatively small amounts, leads
to a break in the contiguity and hence contraction of the
common contiguous set, the resulting IOS may satisfy the
conditions in Proposition 1. This would lead to a unique
PSNE, the IOS itself, which is desirable both individually
and socially. On the other hand, the original higher budgets
would have been such that they led to either the violation of
the uniqueness conditions owing to excessive contiguity, or
a conflicting IOS. This would result in uncountable number
of PSNE’s, of which a significant fraction may be starkly
undesirable.
4 CONCLUSION
We considered a resource allocation game with linear utility
function and a bound on resources that can be allocated to
any node by the two players combined; these resulted in
linear common coupled constraints and hence a resource
allocation polytope game. We showed that, assuming play-
ers have strict preference orderings over nodes, the game
has a unique PSNE if and only if the independent optimal
strategy profile (IOS) is non-conflicting and either (a) the
common contiguous set consists of at most one node, or (b)
all the nodes in the common contiguous set are invested
on by only one player in the IOS. Also, if the game has
a unique PSNE, it is same as the IOS, else the number of
PSNE’s is uncountable. We also derived a socially optimal
strategy profile. For obtaining the price of anarchy and the
price of stability, we provided a characterization of PSNE,
developed a linear program, and proposed an efficient
greedy algorithm. Under reasonable conditions, we showed
that the price of stability is 1. We concluded by presenting an
interesting paradox in this game, that higher budgets may
lead to worse outcomes.
A possible future direction is to consider more general
utility functions and complex common coupled constraints.
It would be interesting to study this game with more than
two players to see if the results are fundamentally different.
The paradox encountered in this game, has a potential of a
detailed study. It may be interesting to measure contiguity
or conflict in IOS that would lead to such a paradox.
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